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Cobb: Municipal Tort Liability: Proprietary-Governmental Distinction Di
CASE COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY: PROPRIETARYGOVERNMENTAL DISTINCTION DISCARDED
Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla.1957)
Plaintiff sued the municipality of Cocoa Beach for damages under
Florida's wrongful death statute., She alleged that her husband's
death resulted from the jailer's negligence in leaving him unattended
in a helpless, intoxicated condition in the municipal jail, which
burned. The trial court dismissed the complaint in accordance with
the established precedent of municipal immunity in the exercise of
governmental functions. On appeal, _Er.,a municipal corporation
is liable, subject to certain limitations, for the direct negligent torts
of its employees on the basis of respondeat superior. Reversed and
remanded.
As observed in the instant case: "It has been held that in the
exercise of so-called governmental functions, the municipality is immune to liability. In the exercise of proprietary functions, the mu2
nicipality has been held responsible for the torts of its agents."
This distinction, originally inferred by an American court 3 from
English case law4 and subsequently accepted by all forty-eight states, 5
has produced inconsistent results not only between but within individual states;6 it has afforded no adequate basis for predicting
which label a court will attach to a particular activity. 7 Furthermore,
the difficulty of differentiating the two functions has become more
and more pronounced as burgeoning municipalities expand their
activities to encompass many fields formerly the exclusive domain of
private enterprise."
The Florida Supreme Court, beginning with an 1850 decision, 9
has liberally circumvented immunity by labeling numerous municipal
activities as proprietary, or corporate, functions.10 Traditionally, how§768.01 (1957).
2At 132. See also 2 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §11.04 (1st ed.
1955); 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §53.01 (3rd ed. 1950).
SBailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
4Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
5PROSSER, TORTS §109 (2d ed. 1955); Note, 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 330 (1953).
(See 2 ANTiEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw §11.19 (1st ed. 1955).
7lbid.
SSee Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1953) (special concurring opinion).
aTallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1850).
IoSee Note, 6 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 330 (1953) for judicial history of municipal im"iFLA.
STAT.
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ever, it has immunized municipalities from liability for the "unlawful and prohibited" acts willfully committed by its officers, employing
an ultra vires rationale."
Until the instant case, recovery was confined to the nominally
proprietary, or corporate, functions, such classification being dependent on the facts in each case. 12 The Court dogmatically adhered,
albeit at times by one vote 3 and over strong dissents, 4 to the proprietary-governmental dichotomy. The replacement of two justices
who had concurred with the majority view laid the predicate for
abandonment of the often criticized 5 doctrine.
Justice Thornal, author of the majority opinion in the instant
case, rejects the hoary distinction as "archaic, "incongruous," and
"anachronistic not only to our system of justice but to democratic
government"; he denies that the English case that gave rise to the distinction ever became part of our common law16 and, in addition, distinguishes that case on the fact that it concerned an unincorporated
community; and, lastly, he notes that "the modern city is in substantial measure a large business institution."
The Court specifically preserves the immunity of a municipality
"in the exercise of legislative or judicial, or quasi-legislative or quasijudicial, functions,' 17 and for illustration cites cases18 holding that a
municipality is not liable for the enforcement of a void ordinance
imposing a license tax nor for the wrongful refusal to grant a building permit. Ironically, both cases used the governmental classification
in supporting immunity, and one was the principal citation of a 1953
decision 9 directly overruled by the instant case.
The problem now arises of defining municipal legislative and
judicial functions, both pure and quasi. In general, the governmental
munity in Florida.
"E.g., Bradley v. Jacksonville, 156 Fla. 493, 23 So.2d 626 (1945); Phair v. Byder,
155 Fla. 677, 21 So.2d 208 (1945); Brown v. Eustis, 92 Fla. 931, 110 So. 873 (1926).
lzTampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940).
3Williams v. Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953).
14Ibid; Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953).
15E.g., Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
ProprietaryTest, 22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936).
16See also Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1953) (special concurring
opinion).
1"At 133.
l8Akin v. Miami, 65 So.2d 54 (1953); Elrod v. Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180
So. 378 (1938).
'9Williams v. Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953).
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authority conferred by the legislature upon municipalities may be
legislative, executive, or judicial. 20 Municipal legislative authority
is ordinarily that vested in a city council or board of aldermen or
commissioners. 21 The Florida Court has defined a city ordinance as
municipal legislation authorized by statute under article VIII, section
8, of the Florida Constitution.22 The judicial function of municipal
courts is limited to the jurisdiction expressly conferred by statute 23 and
such other incidental authority as may be necessary to give effect to
the powers granted.24 In many instances, however, the separation of
municipal powers is not complete, since councils and commissions
2
perform many duties not of a legislative character. 5
The instant case, while expanding municipal liability to allow
recovery for the direct negligent torts of all city employees acting
within the scope of their employment, apparently continues the immunity of a municipality for the willful, or ultra vires, acts of its
agents. This immunity seems, as Justice Hobson has asserted,26 violative of the letter and spirit of section 4 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Florida Constitution. Rejection of this immunity might impel
municipalities to adopt more stringent standards in the selection of
their employees and to minimize political patronage.2 7 Moreover,
the express retention of municipal immunity in respect to legislative
and judicial functions opens a new, although perhaps narrowed,
avenue of categorical uncertainties that may ultimately lead the
Court into further logical cul-de-sacs.
WARREN

H. COBB

2oNelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 So.2d 131 (1942).
211 ANTiEAu, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §4.00 (lst ed. 1955); 2 MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§10.06 (3d ed. 1950).

22Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 10 So.2d 307 (1942); see FLA. STAT. §165.19
(1957).
23FLA. CoNs. art. 5, §34.
24Farragut v. Tampa, 156 Fla. 107, 22 So.2d 645 (1945).
25See 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §9.09 (3d ed. 1950).

26Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1955) (special concurring opinion);
see Williams v. Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56, 57 (Fla. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
27See Miami v. Bethel, supra note 26.
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